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NOTES

plan may adequately satisfy the needs of the state. The net result is
that every state is compelled to adopt a plan modelled along the lines
set forth in Titles III and IX and Congress is in effect legislating by
remote control. It is suggested, however, that an amendment providing
for the earmarking of the tax collected in states having no approved
plan for general relief of unemployment hardships in those states be
added to the Act. The grant-in-aid title would still be an effective inducement for state plans of the type desired and no state could protest
on the ground of discrimination or compulsion.
JoHN L. WADDLETON.
CORPORATIONS-COMPENSATION OF PROAOTERs-FRAUD.-The problem of promoters is one which has long perplexed the courts of this
country. There has been little uniformity of opinion on the matter, as
is illustrated by the contrary decisions prevalent among the many existing cases. The controversy embraces a wide field of promotional and
corporate problems, and though the issue can seldom be determined
concerning a specific case without first reviewing the particular circumstances of the case in question, several broad principles have evolved
which may serve to enlighten somewhat a consideration of the numerous difficulties which involve this problem.
It is now undisputed that the promoter performs a valuable service
in the field of corporate finance. Possessed of a peculiar knowledge of
industrial affairs he is able to judge with a fair degree of accuracy the
potential possibilities of a proposed venture. He is acquainted with the
materials required and their relative value. He is aware of the proper
ratio which operating capital must bear to total assets. In these and
numerous other matters he supplies the expert advice necessary to the
organization of a well planned corporation.' That he is entitled to a
fair compensation for this service is beyond dispute. 2 The problem isHow may this compensation be made legally? Under what plan may
he be compensated, and what assurance is there that the selected arrangement will not be upset by the courts? If the compensation were a
cash payment of an amount fairly estimated as the reasonable value
of his services, there could be no question concerning its legality. 3 But,
as the newly formed corporation seldom has adequate cash resources
to meet other than the urgent requirements of the business, the problem is rarely settled in so simple a manner. The device generally
adopted has been one of awarding compensation by giving the promoter an interest in the corporation, either by way of par value stock,
warrants. And this is where the
no par value stock, or stock purchase
4
parties run afoul of the law.
'GERSTENERG, FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
2 CORPORATION FINANCE (1909) 156.

(1924) 415;

LoUGH,

Mason v. Carrothers, 105 Me. 392, 74 AtI. 1030 (1909); Fitzpatrick v. O'Neil,
43 Mont. 552, 118 Pac. 273 (1911); United German Silver Co. v. Bronson, 92
Conn. 266, 102 At. 647 (1917).
3 Southern Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Scott, 46 Il1. App. 285 (1892).
'Hebgen v. Koeffer, 97 Wis. 313, 72 N. W. 745 (1897) ; Franey v. Wauwnatosa
Park Co., 99 Wis. 40, 74 N.W. 548 (1898) ; Pietsch v. Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647,
101 N.W. 338 (1904); Richland Oil Co. v. Morriss, 108 Va. 288, 61 S.E. 762
(1908) ; Mason v. Carrothers, 105 Me. 392, 74 At. 1030 (1909).
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The use of par value stock as a means of compensation raises the
problem of watered stock. The investor has the right to believe that the
capitalization of the corporation represents the true value of the assets.5
Though the promoter contributes something of unquestionable value to
the corporation, that something is of an intangible and indefinite nature.
The value which he places upon his service, perhaps in entirely good
faith, may not correspond with the value that another equally well informed expert might place upon the same service. There is always
room for argument as to the true value of the benefit thus conferred.
But aside from this problem there is yet another and more serious
question. What tangible investment does the stock issued to a promoter
in compensation for his services represent? It is listed as a liability
upon the books of the corporation, and the courts have frequently held
that it must be balanced by some visible asset.6 Since the work of the
promoter has been. done prior to the existence of the corporation, he
has no contract for remuneration with anyone. The courts have refused to recognize his status or allow any uniform method for his compensation. A payment in par value stock is frowned upon as it increases
the capitalization without any equivalent increase in assets, and thus
assertedly "waters" the stock of the corporation.7 The presumption
thus follows that the subsequent stockholders and creditors have been
deceived into dealing with the corporation through a misrepresentation
as to its true financial status.
The use of no par value stock as a method of compensation eliminates the latter objection, unless the stock has been issued under a
plan or statute which requires that a definite value be set upon each
share. 8 Where no definite value has been'given neither the subsequent
stockholders nor the creditor can complain that the stock has been
"watered." In theory, the assets and profits of the corporation are the
only determinants of the value of such stock. Originally it mattered not
whether the price to all subscribers was uniform, nor whether any real
benefit accrued to the corporation. 9 Subsequently, however, there has
developed the principle of equitable contribution, under which one
block of such stock may not be issued for a high price and another for
a relatively low price unless the discrepancy is justified by some good
business reason. 10 In certain states statutory requirements would seem
to provide that all no par value stock be issued at the same price."
The stock purchase warrant, a relatively recent development in
corporate finance, is apparently the most expeditious method of awarding compensation to the promoter. 12 This device consists of a promise
in writing to sell stock to the holder for a specified price at some future
Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 57 N.E. 656 (1900) ; Old Dominion Copper
Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass 315, 74 N.E. 653 (1905).
GNote 5, supra.
7 United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 223 Fed. 55, 167 (1915); DODD, STOCK
WATERINC (1930) 5.
8 Richardson v. Devine, 193 Mass. 336, 79 N.E. 771 (1907) ; Canton Masonic
Benefit Society v. Rockhold, 26 II. App. 141 (1887).
9 COOK, Stock Without Par Value (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 583.
10 Modgnan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 13 F. (2d) 781 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1926).
11 BERLE, Problems of No Par Stock (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 43, 54, note 20..
12 BERLE, Convertible Securities and Stock Purchase Warrants (1927) 36 Yale
L. J. 649; GARNER AND FORSYTHE, Stock Purchase Warrants and "Rights."
(1931) 4 So. CAL. L. REV. 269-292, 375-392.
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time. Thus the fortunes of the promoter are linked with the fortunes
of the corporation. If the corporation does not succeed, the promoter
does not profit. If it does succeed, the amount of compensation received
will depend upon the relative success'of the corporation as reflected in
the value of its stock. A further advantage is that the stock purchase
warrant does not affect the capitalization of the corporation. No immediate cash or stock payment is contemplated, and therefore the corporation may devote all of its original assets to the operation of its
business.
Controversies concerning the compensation of promoters have
arisen not so much because of the use of 'the methods outlined, but
because of the abuse of these methods. Fraudulent promotion schemes
have induced a skeptical attitude on the part of the courts, and in any
controversy the burden of showing that the method of his compensation has in no way prejudiced the rights of stockholders or creditors
has come to rest upon the promoter. No problem arises where the promoter, acting at arm's length, has made a truthful and complete disclosure of the facts of incorporation, and where an independent board
of directors or all of the stockholders with full knowledge of these3
facts and without collusion have ratified the method of compensation .
The difficulty arises where the promoter, activated by the desire for
excessive or fraudulent profit, purchases or manages to control all of
the original stock'of the corporation. 4 His services or certain property
which he has previously acquired may then be sold to the corporation
at an excessive valuation, the transaction may be ratified by "dummy"
directors or stockholders under his control, and the fraudulent enterprise is complete. Subsequent stock purchasers or creditors will be dealing with a corporation ostensibly legal and sound, but in fact stripped
of a major portion of its assets. It is with this problem that courts have
been at greatest variance.
Whether the promoter is compensated in par value or no par value
stock makes little difference in the latter type of promotion. He has
without an equivalent return milked the corporation of a portion of its
operating capital. The measure of value of the non par stock to the
corporation is the amount at which this stock will sell to the public.
It is true that the creditors have not extended credit upon any authorized valuation of this stock and therefore have little cause to complain, but the rights of subsequent stockholders are unquestionably impaired by the resulting diminution in the corporate assets. 5 Here many
of the courts have invoked the theory that the promoter bears a fiduciary relationship to the corporation; that the assets are placed with'
him in trust, to be tuned over by him to subsequent stockholders undiminished and unimpaired. 6
13
'4

New Sonmbrero P. Co. v. Erlanger (1878) L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1236.
Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 315, 74 N.E. 653 (1905) ; Old
Dominion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L.ed. 1025
(1908).

35

Brockelbank, The Compensation of Promoters (1934) 13

OR. L.

REv. 195,

219.

16 California Caliveras Mining Co. v. Walls, 170 Cal. 285, 149 Pac. 595 (1915)
Porter v. Morris, 131 Ark. 382, .199 S.W. 106 (1917) ; American Forging &

Socket Co. v. Wiley, 206 Mich. 664, 173 N.W.515 (1919) ; Pietsch v. Milbrath,
123 Wis. 647, 101 N.W. 388 (1904).
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The Old Dominion Cases" form the background for the law upon
the problem in this country. There the promoters, while holding all
of the original stock, sold mining property to the corporation for an
amount of par value stock far in excess of the true worth of the property. Since the promoters were the shareholders there could be no question as to full knowledge of this excessive price: There was no showing
at the trial of a resulting insolvency, a fraud upon creditors, or a violation of any statute. Suit was brought by the corporation to avoid the
sale. The Massachusetts court found a fiduciary relationship to exist
between the promoters and the corporation.' 8 It rescinded the sale on
the ground that the corporation had not been provided with an independent board of directors, and full disclosure of the facts had not been
made. It disregarded the status of the promoters as sole shareholders,
viewed the corporation as a separate entity, and found that the corporation as such had been injured by the action of the promoters.
The United States Supreme Court, on the same set of facts, found
no such separate entity to exist.'" The conclusion therein was that since
the promoters owned all the original stock, there had been full knowledge of all the facts; that no wrong had been perpetrated at the time
of the sale, since the rights of none of the then existing shareholders
had been impaired; that the subsequent entry of other shareholders into
the corporate structure did not act to create a wrong previously nonexistent; and that were recovery allowed the corporation a portion of
the benefit would inure to the advantage of original shareholders entirely without claim. The result of such reasoning seems only too clear.
It would appear to open the door to uncontrolled fraudulent promotion.
Though this decision does not bar the right of the subsequent stockholder to recover from the promoter in a personal action, it virtually
nullifies the remedy of the injured stockholders as a group, and the
expense resulting from the multiplicity of suits necessary to a complete
recovery might well exhaust
the subject matter of the controversy and
20
pauperize the litigants.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in considering this question, points
out a distinction between the situation in which all of the authorized
stock has been issued to the promoters before the time of the excessive
sale, and the situation in which, though the promoters own all of the
then issued stock, a quantity has been reserved for sale to "outsiders"
after the excessive sale has been transacted and approved. 2 ' In the first
instance the court denies any right of recovery by the corporation in
a subsequent action. In the latter instance the court recognizes the right
of the corporation to recover on the ground that the fiduciary relationship between promoter and corporation continues to exist until such
time as the last share is disposed of, or until some reasonable method
of protecting the interests of the corporation has been established.
"7Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 315, 74 N.E. 653 (1905) ; Old
Doinrinion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L.ed.

1025 (1908).

Is Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 315, 74 N.E. 653 (1905).

19 Old Doninion Copper Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L.ed.
1025 (1908).
20Brockelbank, The Compensation of Promters (1934) 13 Oa. L. REv. 195,
21

209-212.
PietsCh v. Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647, 655, 101 N.W. 388 (1904).

No. 2]

NOTES

The point of variante then between the many courts which have
considered the problem is briefly this-May a corporation bring an action against the promoters to recover secret profits resulting from
transactions perpetrated at a time when the promoters owned or controlled all of the stock? The majority of courts hold that it can, basing
its conclusion upon the presumption that there is a continuing fiduciary relationship which exists until the corporation has come into the
complete control of those for whom it was originally intended-the
subsequent "outside" stockholders. 22 The minority opinion is that expressed
by the United States Supreme Court in the Old Dominion
2
Cases.

3

In the recent case of McCandless v. Fudaud4 the Supreme Court
went far toward adopting the majority opinion. Here the promoter
sold gas fields to the corporation for an amount greatly in excess of
their true value. Payment was made to the promoter in mortgage
bonds, mortgage notes, and no par stock, which the promoter offered
for sale and immediately disposed of. At the time the sale was transacted the promoter was in control of all of the then issued stock. The
circulars which the defendant published to advertize the mortgage
bonds and notes stated that the proceeds were to be used to acquire
property, and to provide cash for developments, extensions and other
zorporate purposes. Less than two years after the incorporation the
roncern was in receivership. The receiver brought this action to compel
the promoter to restore illicit gains.
The Court found that the diversion of assets to the promoter had
rendered the corporation insolvent from the moment of its inception;
that the mortgage bonds and notes, a great portion of the proceeds of
which had been diverted to the promoter, had created a lien upon the
assets of the corporation far in excess of their true value; that there
was here an unconscionable attempt to strip the corporation of its very
means for discharging these liens, thereby perpetrating a fraud against
the creditors; that the assent of the shareholders was not operative to
legalize a depletion of assets which rendered the company insolvent
thereby depriving the creditors of their lawful rights and remedies;
that the action was in violation of a state statute which provided that
"no corporation shall issue stocks or bonds except for money, labor
done, or money or property actually received; and all fictitious increase
of stock or indebtedness shall be void."; and that the funds diverted to
the promoter would remain with him in trust, to continue so until the
depleted assets had fully discharged the liens. judgment was granted
requiring full restitutidn to the corporation of all illicit gains derived,
not only from the mortgage bonds and notes, but from the no par stock
as well.
Thus the Court invoked the theory of fiduciary relationship which
it had disavowed in the Old Dominion Cases.25 It is evident that, so
far as the mortgage bonds and notes are involved, this case may readily
be distinguished from the Old Dominion Cases. In the instant case the
22Haywood v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 57 N.E. 656 (1900); Nebraska Mausoleamn Co. v. Matters, 108 Neb. 618, 626, 627, 188 N.W. 231 (1922).
23210 U.S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L.ed. 1025 (1908).
-456 Sup. Ct. 41 (1935).

25 210 US..

206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L.ed. 1025 (1908).
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promoter not only appropriated the assets of the corporation, he also
saddled it with a lien indebtedness which rendered it insolvent. Here
the rights of creditors are impaired. In the Old Dominion Cases the
shareholders complained. The Court here refused to consider the right
of a subsequent stockholder to bring suit in the name of the corporation. On principle, however, it is submitted that there is no essential
difference between a suit by a corporation to effect restitution to a
defrauded creditor or one to effect restitution to an injured shareholder,
so long as there has been in both cases a breach of the fiduciary relationship and a conversion of assets held in trust.
Had the Court ordered restitution only in the amount of the illicit
gain derived from the mortgage bonds and notes, the distinction which
it sought to draw might more readily be accepted. It would then be
evident that the wrong spoken of was one which primarily affected the
corporation and indirectly affected the 'creditors. 28 But the Court did
not stop here. It ordered restitution of the amount of illicit gain derived from the no par stock. It has long been recognized that an overissue of no par stock does not materially affect the rights of creditors.27 How else than by a resort to the theory of a fiduciary relationship may the Court justify its order compelling the promoter to disgorge profit derived from no par stock? The shareholders -had agreed
to the disposition of the stock with full knowledge as to the facts.
There is no showing that the disposition impaired the rights of creditors, other than the subsequent insolvency of the corporation, and the
cause of this insolvency was clearly the lien indebtedness. The Court
.infers that this decision does not controvert the principle of the Old
Dominion Cases, but the language used and the result arrived at lend
credence to the belief that it does just this.
No valid reason is found to exist which would preclude a rule of
law compelling a promoter to surrender up to the corporation excessive or fraudulent profit obtained at the expense or injury of subsequent shareholders. The threadbare suggestion that the shareholders
have consented crumbles before the proof of an obvious fraud. It is
not contended that the promoter is entitled to no form of profit. Nor
is it contended that he bears to the corporation the same fiduciary relationship as does a director. If the promoter strikes a bargain in the
purchase of assets which he later turns over to the corporation at a
profit, the corporation cannot be heard to complain if it has received
its money's worth. 2 It is where the promoter has not delivered an
equivalent in value for the compensation he has received, and through
subterfuge or artifice has worked an injury upon the corporation, its
*creditors, or its subsequent stockholders, that a remedy should be provided. It is suggested that a broad application of the theory of fiduciary
relationship will not only enable the corporation to protect its creditors
and stockholders, but will enfoice upon the promoter ftstrict liability
for injury resulting from a breach of frtist.
RIcHARD B. JOHNS, JR.
2 The appropriation of the mortgage proceeds by the promoter had bankrupted

the corporation, thus affecting the rights'of the creditors.
v. Scaring, 78 N.J. Eq. 146.162, 78 AtI. 762 (19105 ; Eureka Mining

27Arnold

Co. v. Lively, 59 Wash. 550, 110 Pac. 425 (1910).
zsSpazlding v. North Mitwubkee T.*S. Co., 106 Wis. 181,.81 -N.W. 1064 (1900).

